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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Economic reform in the People’s Republic of China since 1978 has dramatically
reoriented the country’s once-Soviet style planned economy toward the market, creating a
vibrant, chaotic, high-growth economy in its place. With these increased freedoms have come
expanded social and material choices for Chinese people. Notably, millions of rural Chinese
have abandoned their plows to seek their fortunes in the city.
However, these economic reforms have not yet led to a commensurate expansion of
political rights for Chinese citizens. To take one striking example, the Communist Party
(“CCP” or “the Party”) has retained its household registration (“hukou”) system, which restricts
the mobility of its population. The massive rural-to- urban migration occurring in China, despite
the presence of the hukou system, has altered the state’s ability to exercise power at both the
national and local levels. It has also disproportionately harmed Chinese of rural origin, who are
burdened more heavily by the system than urban hukou holders.
This paper will examine the effects of the hukou system on China’s political structure and
on its migrants. After discussing the origin of the household registration system and its Mao-Era
effects on rural Chinese, it will explore its interplay with the post-1978 revival of mass migration
of rural Chinese to urban centers. Specifically, the paper will elucidate the economic and
political opportunities these changes have created for the central and local governments, while
also examining ho w this same interaction between migration and the continued implementation
of the hukou system has damaged the ability of all levels of government to project power
effectively. Furthermore, the paper will explore how migrants themselves have affected and
been affected by this tumultuous evolution.
II. LIBERATION & THE BIRTH OF THE HUKOU S YSTEM

¶4

Soon after the Communists defeated the KMT and founded the People’s Republic of
China (“PRC”), the Party initiated a series of economic reform measures that ultimately, albeit
inadvertently, led to the creation of the hukou system and the consequent legal segregation of
urban and rural Chinese. Following the Soviet economic model, Beijing’s planners hoped to
extract China’s agricultural economic surplus to fuel urban industrialization. 1 To focus the
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¶5

¶6

¶7

countryside’s energies on agricultural production for this purpose, the CCP collectivized
agriculture and abolished the peasantry’s 2 traditional sources of non- farming income, such as
“handcrafts, small-scale livestock rearing, and petty trading.”3 Likewise, to facilitate the
implementation of these reforms and preempt evasion, the government created household
registration books (huji bu) for each family to allow the authorities to track the whereabouts of
all rural Chinese. 4
Apart from fostering economic growth, the new industrialization program sought to
ameliorate economic disparities between costal and inland urban centers that surfaced during the
Republican period, and so mandated that “the greater part of the new industry . . . be located in
the interior so that industry may gradually become evenly distributed.”5 From 1952 to 1957,
non-costal provinces received over 58% of industrial investment, leading to a dramatic boost to
urban living standards across the count ry. 6
Under these policies, new industries sprouted up in cities across the nation. Rural
Chinese everywhere were drawn by the wealth of the industrializing cities and their relatively
prosperous inhabitants. The allure of the urban areas, coupled with the poverty and economic
devastation that pervaded the countryside (in part due to Beijing’s policies), left rural Chinese
with one option for economic betterment: migration to the cities. From 1949 to 1957, China’s
cities absorbed up to 26.27 million individuals from the countryside, 7 which accounted for 70%
of urban growth. 8
Fearing social unrest fomented by uncontrolled urban population growth and the
unraveling of their economic plans, China’s State Council and the Ministries of Internal Affairs
and Labor began to issue directives to halt “blind” rural migration to the cities in 1953. 9 In 1957
the government established detention centers to return peasants to the countryside. But all of
these plans failed to stem the migration tide. Finally, in 1958 the CCP issued a law that impeded
migration and has distorted China’s socio-economic fabric to this day: The Household
Registration Regulations of the PRC. Initially it seemed this policy too would not succeed, since
the contemporaneous—and economically disastrous—Great Leap Forward witnessed the

553, 557 (1995) (reviewing M ICHAEL R. DUTTON , POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN CHINA: FROM PATRIARCHY TO
“THE PEOPLE” (1992)). For an alternate historical/cultural conception of the CCP’s economic program, see
BARRINGTON M OORE , JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 179 (1966).
2
It is important to note that the concept of “peasant,” or nongmin, as used in contemporary Chinese discourse lacks
a deep historical context. The term, imported from Japanese, first appeared in Chinese-English dictionaries in 1912.
Traditionally, rural China had a highly diversified economy, with rural households participating in numerous lightor cottage-industries along with agriculture. The concept of the peasant, in which an individual subsists almost
entirely off of his agricultural production, is a modern invention in Chinese society—one made real, in part, by the
imposition of the hukou system during the Mao Era. Li Ling, Note, Towards a More Civil Society: Mingong and
Expanding Social Space in Reform-Era China, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. RE V. 149, 167-68 (2001); infra text
accompanying note 3.
3
R. J. R. KIRBY, URBANIZATION IN CHINA: TOWN AND COUNTRY IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY 1949-2000 AD 22
(1985); cf. M OORE , supra note 1, at 179.
4
DOROTHY J. SOLINGER, CHINA’S TRANSIENTS AND THE STATE: A FORM OF CIVIL SOCIETY? 7 (USC Seminar Series
No. 1, 1991).
5
Mao Zedong, On the Ten Major Relationships, Address Before the Political Bureau of the Central Committee
(Apr. 25, 1956), in THE SELECTED WORKS OF M AO TSE-TUNG 284, 284-307 (1977).
6
KIRBY, supra note 3, at 110, 138.
7
CHINA FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLISHING HOUSE , NEW CHINA’S POPULATION 58 (1988); see SOLINGER,
supra note 4, at 7; He, supra note 1, at 180.
8
KIRBY, supra note 3, at 109.
9
SOLINGER, supra note 4, at 7; He, supra note 1, at 180; Ji, supra note 1, at 557.
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ballooning of the urban population from 99 million in 1957 to 130 million four years later. 10
However, after this aberrant period of economic chaos passed, China’s migration levels
collapsed and remained low until the late 1970s (See Fig. 1 11 ). 12
III. THE DIVISION OF RURAL & URBAN CHINA
¶8

¶9

Beijing ostensibly created the hukou system “to maintain social order, protect citizens’
rights and benefits, and to serve in the construction of socialism.”13 Its most significant effect,
however, was to employ the hujibu 14 to erect a hereditary, matrilineal system that divided
China’s agricultural and non-agricultural populations, and effectively bound the peasantry to the
land they tilled. 15 The Household Registration Regulations declared that:
Article 6
Citizens should register as permanent residents in the place they regularly reside.
One citizen can only have permanent resident registration in one location.

¶10

Article 7
Within a month after the birth of an infant, the head of the household, relatives,
parental guardians, or neighbors will file the registration of the baby’s birth at the
institution responsible for registering permanent residency.
Adoptive parents or an orphanage will file the registration of an orphan’s birth at
the institution responsible for registering permanent residency.

¶11

Article 10
Before a citizen moves out of his registration’s jurisdiction, he or the head of the
household will file registration for moving out of the jurisdiction at the institution

10

SOLINGER, supra note 4, at 7; see SHENG LANG, RENKOU YU CHENGSHIHUA [POPULATION AND URBANIZATION]
36 (1987) [hereinafter POPULATION AND URBANIZATION].
11
CHINA FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLISHING HOUSE , supra note 7, at 59.
12
See Mallee, supra note 1, at 136; He, supra note 1, at 177, 180.
13
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli [The Household Registration Regulations of the People’s
Republic of China] § 1 (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu 1958) [hereinafter Household Registration Regulations].
14
See supra text accompanying note 4.
15
Zhejiang Province Propaganda Bureau, Huji Zhidu Gaige Zhuanti Baodao [A Report on the Special Subject of
Household Registration System Reform], Nov. 2001, available at
http://www.china110.com/police/plnews/gdjs/zhej/item/2001_11/574595.shtml [hereinafter Report on the Special
Subject of HRSR]; Mallee, supra note 1, at 138; SOLINGER, supra note 4, at 7; Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law
Enforcement Campaigns as a Means of Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-Urban Migrant Enclave in
Beijing, 17 COLUM. J. A SIAN L. 121, 122 (2003); Ji, supra note 1, at 557; Li , supra note 2, at 154; Wo Guo
Quanmian Tuijin Huji Zhidu Gaige [The Comprehensive Advancement of Our Country’s Household Registration
System Reform], RENMIN RIBAO, Aug. 14, 2002, available at
http://news.tfol.com/news/zhuanti/block/html/2003080100479.html [hereinafter Comprehensive Household
Registration Reform]; Zhongguo Xianxing Huji Zhidu Wu Nian Zhi Nei Chedi Gaige [The Thorough Reform of
China’s Current Household Registration System Five Years from Now], Tianfu Rexian, available at
http://news.tfol.com/news/zhuanti/block/html/2003073100449.html [hereinafter The Reform of China’s Current
HRS Five Years from Now].
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responsible for household registration, obtain a certificate for moving, and nullify
his household registration.
A citizen moving from a village to the city must hold proof from the city’s Labor
Department, proof of a school’s acceptance, or proof of an immigration permit
from the institution responsible for registering permanent residency of that city.
He must then go to the institution responsible for registering his permanent
residency and apply to go through emigration procedures . . . 16
¶12

Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulations legally compel every individual to become a part of the
hukou system. 17 Article 10, while superficially a delineation of the household registration
transfer process, in practice prohibited nearly all such movements; the bureaucratic institutions
controlling the hukou system, such as the Public Security Bureau (“PSB” or “Gonganju”) and
work units (danwei), rarely provided the documents necessary to move. 18
¶13
Government policies that allocated “free compulsory education, urban employment,
public housing, free medical services, and retirement benefits” to holders of urban hukou
registration broadened the system’s urban/rural divide. 19 Because those carrying agricultural
registration received none of these benefits, which they could not otherwise acquire in an urban
economy lacking even a rudimentary market system, they had to rely on the land to survive.
Articles 15 and 16 of the Household Registration Regulations highlight the pervasive social
controls the hukou system established:
Article 15: When a citizen temporarily resides outside of the place of his
permanent residence for over three days, he or a household head of the place of
temporary residence will register for temporary residence at the institution
responsible for registering household registration within three days, and before
leaving he will have it nullified. An individual temporarily residing at a hotel will
simultaneously register through the hotel for a traveler-registration registry.
A citizen who permanently resides in the city and temporarily resides within that
county or temporarily resides in a village outside his place of permanent residence
does not need to register for temporary residency except, when temporarily
residing at a hotel, for registering through a hotel for a traveler-registration
registry.
Article 16: A citizen leaving his place of permanent residence for personal
reasons must apply for a time extension or go through migration procedures at the
institution responsible for household registration if the time for temporary
Household Registration Regulations, arts. 6-7, 10.
See also id. art. 4 (explicating the distribution and implementation of household registries).
18
See id. art. 3; Zhejiang Province Propaganda Bureau, supra note 15; Mallee, supra note 1, at 138; He, supra note
1, at 177; Li, supra note 2, at 155-56.
19
Li, supra note 2, at 156; see Zhejiang Province Propaganda Bureau, supra note 15; Mallee, supra note 1, at 136,
138; He, supra note 1, at 181; Ji, supra note 1, at 557; Comprehensive Household Registration Reform, supra note
15; cf. Letter from Li Yu, Teacher, Chinese University of Geosciences, Wuhan, to Hayden Windrow (June 5, 2004)
(on file with author); Letter from Miao Xun, Teacher, Chinese University of Geosciences, Wuhan, to Hayden
Windrow (June 2, 2004) (on file with author).
16
17
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residency exceeds three months; if the individual has neither reason for a time
extension nor meets the conditions for migration, he must return to the place of
his permanent residence. 20
¶14

Even in cases of temporary location changes, from vacation to attending family affairs,
individuals had to register their movement with government authorities. Furthermore, as the
second part of Article 15 (and Article 10 21 ) demonstrates, controls proved significantly more
onerous for rural residents. Apart from the rare employment, education, or work-transfer
opportunity, it was virtually impossible to change residency. 22 With this system in place, Beijing
could both exploit the agricultural sector to advance industrial development and ensure urban
political stability to safeguard its power.
IV. ECONOMIC REFORM & SUBVERSION OF THE HUKOU S YSTEM

¶15

Soon after rural economic reforms began under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese
peasants—those whom Beijing had branded with agricultural hukou status—initiated a push
against the government’s economic and social controls to sever “the invisible belt [of household
registration] that restrained [their] free movement” that continues to this day. 23 In 1978 the
government issued new policies to improve the economic plight of those working on agricultural
collectives. 24 Poorer regions, though, soon exceeded the regulation’s mandate and abolished the
collectives in favor of a return to household farming. Notwithstanding central government
efforts, the trend spread across rural China. In 1979 the Party responded by unveiling its policy
of Contracting Output to the Household (bao chan dao hu), and in 1981, Contracting Work to the
Household (bao gan dao hu) (“Household Responsibility System”), which just effectively
legitimized the already-accomplished return to pre-Communist tenant farming. 25 By 1983, 98%
of rural households had decollectivized. 26
¶16
Abolition of the communes quickly led to the resurrection of rural and urban agricultural
markets. This development in turn severed the vital link between urban household registration
and the ability to survive in the city, since migrants no longer needed to depend on government
grain distributions to procure food when away from their place of residence. 27 The ability to
survive in the cities independently of the state, in tandem with the reemergence of a 100-200
20

Household Registration Regulations, arts. 15-16.
See supra text accompanying note 16.
22
Mallee, supra note 1, at 140; Comprehensive Household Registration Reform, supra note 15; cf. He, supra note
15, at 127.
23
Comprehensive Household Registration Reform, supra note 15.
24
See Department of International Cooperation & Department of Development Planning of the Ministry of
Agriculture of the People's Republic of China, Reform from 1978, at http://www.cafte.gov.cn/5.htm (last modified
Oct. 22, 2002).
25
Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y. K. Woo, The “Worthy” Unemployed: Societal Stratification and
Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 457, 465-56
(1995). This legislative acceptance of events already occurred would become a hallmark of the post-1978 hukou
reform regime. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
26
GORDON W HITE, RIDING THE TIGER: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN POST -M AO CHINA 100 (1993); see
Peter Ho, Contesting Rural Spaces: Land Disputes, Customary Tenure and the State, in CHINESE SOCIETY, CHANGE ,
CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 93, 93, 95 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden, eds., 2d. 2003); Mallee, supra note 1, at
136.
27
He, supra note 1, at 181; see He, supra note 15, at 124; supra text accompanying note 19; cf. Mallee, supra note
1, at 142; Li, supra note 2, at 156-57.
21
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million-person rural labor surplus following decollectivization28 and the return of rural economic
stagnation, 29 prompted renewed migration of millions of rural Chinese to urban areas in search of
greater prosperity (See Fig. 2 30 ). By 2002 there were an estimated 120 million internal migrants
in China. 31
V. COMPETING AGENDAS: LOCAL RESPONSES TO RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION
Confronted with an explosion of rural-to-urban migration, China’s local governments32
have responded with numerous, often inconsistent policies that have varied over time and by
region. From the inception of the hukou system, the Chinese central government has delegated
its enforcement to local authorities, 33 often with little or inconclusive guidance. 34 While this
delegation of discretionary authority may have proven adequate based on the magnitude of
migration in 1958, the original hukou system never envisioned the arrival of the market
economy, and with it the unprecedented scale of “blind” migration the system was devised to
combat. 35
¶18
The new realities of rural- urban migration have posed difficult challenges to the
resources of local urban governments, which over time have erected formidable bureaucratic
apparatuses to regulate migrants. Apart from the statements of official national policy, the
variety of offices, rules, measures, and fees designed to control and profit from the migrant
population suggests that local governments in urban areas exercise the most pervasive and
tangible authority of any political institution over migrants. This haphazard, poorly regulated
devolution of hukou enforcement has ensured that policies of different cities often diverge from
and sometimes conflict with each other, and even flout promulgated national policy. These
discrepancies admittedly point to underlying weaknesses and inconsistencies within household
registration and Chinese migration law; but more insightfully, they reveal layers clashing
objectives among different levels of government. Furthermore, the consequences of this
dynamic on the migrant population are not obvious and are often unpredictable. A discussion of
recent phenomena will suggest, however, that the migrants who bear the brunt of the
discriminatory hukou system are not entirely without recourse and can potentially influence local
governments to their advantage.
¶17

28

He, supra note 1, at 181; He, supra note 15, at 124; cf. Mallee, supra note 1, at 136, 142; XU FENG, W OMEN
M IGRANT W ORKERS IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM 68 (2000); Li, supra note 2, at 152.
29
Mallee, supra note 1, at 142; SHENG, supra note 10, at 52; Li, supra note 2, at 182; cf. id. at 162.
30
REEITSU KOJIMA, URBANIZATION AND URBAN PROBLEMS IN CHINA 22 (1987); see Mallee, supra note 1, at 136.
31
Neidi Liudong Renkou Gaoda Yier [Internal Migrants in Mainland reach 120 million high], Xindao Ribao, Oct. 7,
2002, at China Section.
32
The term “local government” as used herein encompasses all levels of government below the national
government, including provincial and municipal people’s congresses, county governments, local PSBs, municipal
administrative agencies, and the panoply of bureaucratic institutions whose authority touches the internal migrant
population. This article deals mostly with the actions of local governments in large cities. For a description of the
attitude of local governments in rural areas where migrants originate, see He, supra note 1, at 183 (arguing that local
home governments encourage and often facilitate migration).
33
Id. at 181.
34
See, e.g., Li, supra note 2, at 159 (arguing that there is no central government agency responsible for regulating
the migrant population).
35
Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes
(1998), available at http://csde.washington.edu/downloads /98-13.pdf.
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A.

Beijing: Administrative Proliferation & Migrant Collusion

¶19

The story of the last twenty years of migrant regulation in Beijing exemplifies many of the
tensions among the actors who promulgate hukou law, those who enforce it, and those who are
subject to it. Official statistics report that as of 2003, of a total population of over 14.5 million,
Beijing had over 4 million non-officially registered citizens; nearly 80% (3.19 million) of these
non-urban hukou holders are migrant laborers and entrepreneurs. 36 This figure is all the more
remarkable as, until fairly recently, there existed no legal way for migrants to conduct business
in Beijing. 37
¶20
The incremental loosening of restrictions on migrant economic activity in Beijing began
with two regulations issued by the Beijing municipal government in 1991. 38 These had two
distinguishing features: they limited applications for petty business (getihu) licenses to those
migrants with a pre-existing connection to a legal resident of Beijing, and they gave discretion to
local administrative agencies to decide which documents were necessary to apply for a getihu
license. The implications of the second characteristic resonate throughout the development of
Beijing hukou and migrant regulation; the more closely Beijing has attempted to regulate nonurban hukou holders, the more Byzantine the network of administrative agencies required to
implement these regulations has become.
¶21
A migrant attempting to establish a foothold in Beijing could potentially come into
contact with a number of local institutions. He 39 might deal with the local public security bureau
to apply for a Temporary Residence Permit. 40 If the migrant intends to apply for a getihu
license, he would do so through the Industry and Commerce Bureau (“ICB”), which is also
responsible for checking migrant licenses and extracting regulatory fees.41 To rent housing from
a local landlord, the migrant would have to register with the Housing and Land Bureau
(“HLB”). 42 If he had a wife or sister with him, she would have to apply for a marriage and
fertility certificate from the Birth Control Committee (“BCC”) as a prerequisite to legally
obtaining work or housing. 43
36

See Beijing Statistic Bureau, Beijing Shi Tongjiju 2003 Nian Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Tongji Gongbao
[Beijing Statistics Bureau 2003 National Economic and Social Development Statistical Report] (Feb. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/tjyl/tjgb/200402090012.htm.
37
He, supra note 1, at 186.
38
Id. at 187. These regulations included a directive, the Notice Regarding Several Questions on Getihu Registration
and Permission, and the Management Measures on Migrants Conducting Business in Beijing.
39
Although there are migrants of both sexes, men dominate migrant construction work, whereas female migrants
can constitute up to 90% of the workforce in the (mostly southern) special economic zones. See Williams & Woo,
supra note 25, at 510-11. For a more in depth look at the demographic makeup of the migrant workforce, see
ZHONGGUO JINGJI KAIFAQU WAILAI RENKOU YANJIU [A STUDY OF THE M IGRANT POPULATION OF CHINA ’S ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ZONES] 6-9 (Wu Yuping, ed., 1996) [hereinafter A STUDY OF THE M IGRANT POPULATION OF
CHINA’S EDZS].
40
Li, supra note 2, at 160-161. On the other hand, according to a survey published in 1992, only 3% of formal
migration to Beijing was approved by public security authorities. Chan & Zhang, supra note 35, at 11. Of the
remaining 97%, two-thirds were approved by other government departments. Higher education institutions and the
military accounted for the remainder of formal migrants.
41
He, supra note 1, at 190-91.
42
Id.
43
Id.; see also Guangzhou City Public Security Bureau Consolidated Identification Processing Division, Shenban
Fuqi Lai Shi Toukao Ruhu Xuzhi [What a Couple Applying for Household Registration to Come to the City to Join
Their Partner Should Know] §§ 2-3, Aug. 18, 2003 (describing the various procedures required for a wife to obtain
an urban hukou and join her husband in the city), available at
http://www.gzjd.gov.cn/jindun2/da04/DB02/c0006_039.htm; Guangzhou City Public Security Bureau Consolidated
Identification Processing Division, Shenban Xiaohai Sui Fu (Huo Sui Mu) Lai Shi Ruhu Xuzhi [What Those
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¶22

One consequence of this decentralized oversight of migrants is that the various agencies
with responsibility for internal migrants interpret policies in mutually conflicting ways. Official
hukou regulations relate the procedures for official migration, but not the precise qualifications;
therefore, different departments can give different content to these procedures. 44 For example, in
the early 1990s the Beijing ICB created a migrant marketplace to decrease unlicensed migrant
street-vending in the Chaoyang District. The market flourished until the police, over whom the
ICB exercises no authority, evicted the migrants, presumably because the market blocked
traffic. 45 A consideration of why the two authorities reacted with conflicting policies leads to the
next key feature of local migrant regulation: the collection of fees.
¶23
According to sections 44 and 45 of The Bylaws for the Implementation of the People’s
Republic of China’s Resident Identification, all fees related to migration—temporary residence
fees, registration & regulation fees, taxes, etc.—should accrue to the national government. 46 By
the admission of administrators themselves, however, local government offices pocket a
percentage of most fees migrants pay. 47 In light of the number of migrants in major cities, these
fees aggregate to constitute a major source of wealth for local governments. Unsurprisingly, this
profit potential spawns administrative behavior that runs counter to the nominal purpose and
function of these agencies, which is to control migration. 48 Local bureaucracies instead have an
incentive to preserve a migrant population high enough to boost local coffers, but not so high as
to incur the disfavor of the central government.
¶24
As one can imagine, the motley assortment of agencies that oversees migrant regulation
is ill-equipped to maintain this delicate balance. At times, drastic measures are needed to appease
the central government. A prime example of what might euphemistically be termed a
“recalibration” of the migrant population is shown in the tumultuous history of Zhejiang Village
in Beijing. 49 In the early 1980s, migrants from Wenzhou in Zhejiang province began to settle in
Fengtai (? ? ), on the outskirts of Beijing, and set up small businesses. By 1986 thousands of
Wenzhouese lived in the area, which came to be known as “Zhejiang Village.” By 1994 nearly
100,000 migrants populated the Village, in contrast to only 14,000 local residents. These
migrants played a major part in the local textile market, especially in the production of leather
goods. During this period, local authorities conducted sporadic “clean- up” campaigns, each time
Applying for Children to Obtain Household Registration to Come to the City with Their Father or Mother Should
Know] § 3, (listing the myriad documents, including proof of birth control policy compliance, required for a child
legally to follow one or both of her parents to the city), available at
http://www.gzjd.gov.cn/jindun2/da04/DB02/c0006_040.htm; Chusheng Shenbao Ruhu Xuzhi [What One Should
Know About Registering a Birth and Obtaining Household Registration] § 2, Sept. 1999 (noting the birth control
policy certification required for a child to receive urban hukou status), available at
http://www.gzjd.gov.cn/jindun2/da04/DB02/c0006_010.htm.
44
Chan & Zhang, supra note 35, at 11; He, supra note 1, at 186.
45
He, supra note 1, at 192-93.
46
Guowuyuan Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jumin Shenfenzheng Tiaoli Shishi Xize” Di Sishisi
Tiao Di Sishiwu Tiao De Pifu [The State Council’s Revision of Sections 44 and 45 of “The Bylaws for the
Implementation of the People ’s Republic of China’s Resident Identification”] (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu Dec. 3,
1991) (stipulating in § 45 that “all local fees estimated received go up to the national treasury”); Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Jumin Shenfenzheng Tiaoli Shishi Xize [The Bylaws for the Implementation of the People ’s Republic of
China’s Resident Identification] § 45 (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu Nov. 1986) (stipulating that “all local fees estimated
received go up to the national treasury”).
47
He, supra note 1, at 192; see Corruption in China: Shooting the Messenger, ECONOMIST , Sept. 4, 2004, at 43.
48
He, supra note 15, at 137.
49
See id. for a detailed account and thorough analysis of Zhejiang Village. The following recapitulation is drawn
from both that article and from Mallee, supra note 1, at 144.
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forcing the migrants to relocate further outside Beijing or in surrounding Hebei Province. In late
1995 local police attempted to permanently raze the Village; 80,000 migrants were uprooted, and
nearly fifty residential compounds were destroyed. Despite the persistence and severity of local
law enforcement, migrants began to return to the Village less than six months later; within a
year, they began to rebuild their homes.
¶25
The tale of Zhejiang Village reveals a great deal about the problems of hukou and
migrant regulation. From the perspective of the municipal government, the migrants in the
Village are an exploitable resource. Because officia l regulations governing internal migrants
leave considerable discretion to administrative agencies, these agencies tailor the implementation
of regulations in ways that maximize their own gain, both monetarily and in terms of the scope
of their jurisdiction. 50 The result in practical terms is that migrants can eke out an existence in
Beijing, but at a price that includes a more onerous regulatory burden compared to urban hukou
holders, along with rent extraction from local bureaucracies.
¶26
The plight of Zhejiang Village suggests another, less quantifiable burden on internal
migrants; the irregularity of clean-up campaigns creates an environment of unpredictability in
which migrants remain unsure of their status within a city. The resulting need for greater
foreseeability explains another peculiar consequence of migrant regulation: collusion between
migrants and local officials. Those bureaucrats who develop economic relationships with
migrant workers 51 derive tremendous economic advantages from the migrants’ semi- legal status
and so do not comply with migrant regulations. 52 These incentives permit migrants to engage in
“legal collusion . . . to overcome . . . hostile legal regulation . . . .”53 Though the local officials in
these “collaborative relationship[s]” behave in an economically parasitic manner, migrants still
derive a net benefit, as evidenced by their willingness to often initiate the relationships. 54
Lacking political or social rights within the cities, they form guanxi, or connections, with local
persons or entities to create a socio-economic space of their own, one with rules that, although
harsh, are habitual and predictable. 55 By strengthening migrant incentives to collude in order to
form a bulwark against severe and capricious state action, the irregular clean-ups in Zhejiang
Village and other migrant-populated localities across China accomplish precisely what they
intend to thwart. 56 Instead of cleansing the cities of the migrant presence, the cleanup campaigns
strengthen the relationships between migrants and petty officials to the material benefit of both
groups. These ties lay the foundation for extra- legal social structures that protect migrants’
positions in urban areas and encourage more rural Chinese to leave the countryside.
B.
¶27

Hukou Commodification: Overreaching or the Market at Work?

The starkest of the conflicts between national policy and local implementation manifests
itself in the phenomenon of hukou commodification. For example, in 1991 the Dezhou region of
50
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Shandong Province publicly announced the price of an official urban registration. 57 It is difficult
to imagine a practice more at odds with the objective of controlling rural-urban migration;
offering urban hukou at a price can only increase the number of a region’s migrants. 58 Though
exorbitant prices of these “economic hukou” (jingji hukou) were prohibitive for most migrants, 59
the soaring demand for urban hukou justified the introduction of the program for the local
government:
At places where the transaction . . . took place, long lines formed [and] traffic was
blocked. . . . Peasants in surrounding villages and townships filled satchels and
flour bags with money they had earned by their blood and sweat and had saved
for several years to conduct [the]transaction . . . . 60
¶28

In effect, local governmental institutions reap profits by ‘liberating’ rural Chinese from the
legal constraints Beijing has forced upon them through the hukou system; bureaucrats skim off
the arbitrage-cost differential between urban and agricultural registration status. It is important
to note that even in these circumstances, repugnant as they appear, migrants themselves have
proven willing to bear the costs of obtaining urban hukou status. 61 They, more than other agents
in the public or private sphere, have pushed against the system and weakened Beijing’s control.
As the popular idiom among migrants states, “there are policies on high but those below have
countermeasures” (shang you zhengce, xia you duice). 62
¶29
The commodification of hukou by lower levels of government was not passively accepted
by the national government. The Ministry of Public Security (Gonganbu) first issued an order in
1992 banning the sale of urban hukou,63 yet the practice flourished in spite of the central
government’s repeated warnings. 64 The Sichuan Yearbook 1993, for example, openly admitted
that 50% of the growth of the non-agricultural population was due to these economic
registrations. 65 However extortionate the practice of urban-hukou sale may appear, especially
considering that were it not for the continued implementation of the hukou system itself this
problem would not exist, one cannot deny the widespread demand among migrants. For many,
purchasing an urban hukou may be the only avenue for obtaining political, social, and economic
rights.
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C.

Silent Masses: The Costs of Migrant Organization & Resistance

¶30

The various manifestations of local government authority over migrant regulation paint a
bleak picture: between rent extraction, hukou sales, and unpredictable clean-up campaigns, it
seems that migrants are victims of the extortionate implementation of an already unfair
institution. Yet, as noted, migrants continue to flock to cities in growing numbers. 66 A question
lurks behind this paradox: do rural-urban migrants have any say over the policies that control
their lives?
¶31
The most fundamental obstacle to migrant organization is legal. For a non-governmental
organization of migrants to be officially recognized, it must be approved by professional
superiors or a responsible government branch. 67 Because migrant laborers and entrepreneurs are
excluded from urban civic franchise, it would be difficult for a group to find a sponsor
organization; the political risk assumed by such a sponsor would make the project untenable. 68
However, there have been a number of informal migrant organizations, most of which attempt to
play the role of a trade association, guaranteeing product quality and initiating public relations
campaigns. 69
¶32
Although attempts to carve out a legitimate role through informal associations are
laudable and generally more realistic than organized resistance to unfair policies, there have been
isolated instances of migrants successfully combating local governments. In 1986 a group of
several hundred migrant traders in Tianj in’s Hexi District, frustrated with excessive assessment
of fees, surrounded and physically assaulted local tax and public security officers. 70 A more
significant act of resistance arose in Beijing’s Zhejiang Village in 1994; there a group of migrant
traders sustained a strike for a week until local authorities agreed to charge fewer discretionary
fees. 71 These isolated examples suggest that, since the revenue derived by local governments
from migrants is earned on a quasi- legal basis, an organized group of migrants can target those
practices that are most suspect. In other words, due to the illicit means by which local officials
extract benefits from migrant workers, who already greatly contribute to urban economic growth
and thereby help maintain a rather apolitical urban population, to a certain degree migrants can
employ both the potential ire of the central government and the threat of general economic
instability against local officials to achieve their political goals.
¶33
Limited evidence points to the potential for successful migrant organization. In Wuxi
County, for example, there is a large group of migrant transport workers under the leadership of
one migrant. 72 Local bureaucrats have developed relations with this man, resulting in his
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controlling a monopoly over most of the county’s transport work. 73 Although the group has done
little to change the legal status of migrant laborers, it has a certain degree of bargaining power
because of its size and strict organization.
¶34
These instances serve as a reminder that migrant regulation by local government is a twoway street. To the extent that administrative agencies wish to profit from migrant labor, the
migrants are a necessary presence. Theoretically—and one should not forget that any
prescriptions for migrant empowerment are speculative—migrants can leverage their numbers
into an amelioration of local policies. In this particular task they have an ally, oddly enough, in
the central government. In one of several peculiar alignments of incentives, Beijing, for obvious
fiscal reasons, also has an interest in eliminating local discretionary fees.
¶35
In 2004 the Ministry of Finance issued a directive banning all irrational surcharges by local
governments on rural laborers in cities. 74 The cynical reaction to this promulgation is that the
central government will never enforce the directive to the extent necessary to eradicate rent
extraction. Nevertheless, the directive derogates from the authority of local governments; it
strips the veneer of legal justification from the exploitation of migrants by administrative
agencies. A result of this loss of validity is that well-organized groups of migrants can have
enhanced bargaining power. The threat of suppression and reprisal by the state looms over any
overt expression of resistance, but this is a relatively constant factor. Insofar as the migrant
population has any opportunity to assert itself, there are no risk- free strategies. Now that the
central government has officially condemned the major direct benefit local governments procure
from the migrant population, migrants have more rhetorical momentum behind them than ever
before.
VI. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REACTIONS & RESPONSES
¶36

In contrast to the mixed, often ambivalent reaction of local governments, the central
government has grown ever- more alarmed at the post-1978 ‘emancipation’ of migrant labor from
the communes, since Beijing can no longer effectively monitor a large segment of the
population. 75 Government enforcement of the hukou system, traditionally one of its most potent
tools to control population mobility in the face of the massive number of rural migrants in
China’s towns and cities, 76 has failed. As already discussed, household registration restrictions
have spawned unlikely alliances between migrant workers and local urban private and public
institutions. These alliances in turn have fractured the central government’s ability to exercise its
political will. Ironically, by creating perverse incentives for public institutions and private actors
to disobey government policies, the semi- legality of migrants’ urban presence that the hukou
system itself creates has exacerbated this impotence. Yet simultaneously, the negative reactions
of urban Chinese to their newly arrived rural brethren actually bolster approval of those state
institutions of oppression that appear to check migrant behavior, such as the Public Security
Bureau; thus, by a circuitous route, the hukou system buttresses the CCP’s legitimacy.
73
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¶37

Nonetheless, bureaucrats clearly benefit from flouting the central government’s will.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in a February 2002 article from the Xinhua News Agency,
the Vice-President of the Ministry of Public Security’s Bureau of Public Order, Bao Suixian,
declared that the Househo ld Registration System “cannot be eliminated” as it constitutes the
“foundation . . . for managing social order” and has “great effect on fighting crime.”77 Among
its other pertinent state uses, he noted that hukou also helps determine “family bloodline
relationships.”78 His first two justifications carry little weight since the government has utterly
failed to control the migration process and increasing crime rates. The last simply smacks of a
desperate attempt to validate the system by any means. The underlying institutional motivations
behind these justifications appeared most brilliantly when Bao advocated the right of free
movement within the country for all citizens, but continued to insist China would still need
hukou ((even though its function will have become moot, and national identity cards
(shenfenzheng) are already widespread)).79 More convincingly, the central Gonganbu supports
the hukou system because it provides its local branches with financial support. As would be
expected, competition between different administrative organs to extract rent from migrants
further hampers implementation of the law. 80
¶38
As early as 1982 Beijing recognized the difficulty of coordinating its migrant
management policies with local institutions, but did not overtly comprehend the underlying
causes. The Announcement of the State Council’s Approval of the Ministry of Public Security’s
Request for Instructions Regarding Solving the Problem of Taking Up Residence Away from the
Village noted that
[r]ecently the number of people in the country without household registration has
been very large, attracting great repercussions of every kind and having influence
on the People’s lives and the stability of social order. Every level of the People’s
government must pay great attention to this issue, strengthen its leadership, and
closely coordinate with every related institution to carry out effective measures.
Every level must help those without household registration to settle down and
work, conscientiously safeguarding migration of the Masses according to
national policies and regulations, and help them settle down with rights and
benefits according to the law. 81
¶39

Beyond expressing Party fear of wandering migrants, 82 the Announcement’s repeated
emphasis on coordination between government agencies at all levels to carry out national
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policies highlights the obstacles facing Beijing’s ability to govern. However, the document gives
no indication that the central government understood the problem to derive from active
coordination between local officialdom and migrants; it simply treats these circumstances as a
product of inept local governance.
¶40
Similarly, the opportunistic, ad hoc partnerships between migrants and local officials
have also neutered the Chinese government’s multiple regulations that aspire to manage
migratory flow. 83 At best, national- level reforms have marked tacit acceptance of the (migrantcreated) status quo. 84 In 1984 the State Council’s Notification on the Question of Peasants
Entering Towns tried to divert migrants away from the largest cities toward small towns and
villages in a policy labeled “litu bulixiang”, or “leave the land but not the countryside”. 85 By
funneling rural Chinese to small- and medium-sized towns rather than the country’s largest
cities, the government hoped to thwart the rise of social instability in urban areas. 86
Economically self- sufficient migrants who did not require state aid for food and housing could
change their hukou status to “‘urban registration with self- supplied grain’ (zili kouliang
chengzhen hukou)”. 87 Unfortunately for Beijing, the policy’s principal effect was not a diversion
of migrants toward towns and villages; instead, mixed-hukou families, a result of the matrilineal
design of the Household Registration Sys tem, formed the bulk of those who took advantage of
the law “by giving the ‘agricultural’ members (mostly women) official urban status.”88 Migrant
families hijacked the law to legalize their previously unregistered presence in urban areas. And
now, twenty years later, Beijing has proposed another hukou reform that would “enabl[e]
migrants residing in small and medium-sized cities to become local residents.”89 Likely, the
results this time will scarcely differ.
A.
¶41

Poor Peasants, Urban Disgust & Legitimization of Communist Control

While the migrant presence in cities has tremendously enhanced the vibrancy of the
country’s economy and benefited most urban residents, 90 much to the consternation of the Party,
it has also amplified social tensions in urban areas between legal urban residents and the
migrants. 91 Ironically, in contrast to the central government’s incessant policy defeats in the
realm of migration control, this unintended dual socio-economic role for rural-hukou migrants—
as individuals who power urban economic growth and concurrently annoy those legally residing
in the cities—has actually buttressed the CCP’s power via an odd combination of boosting urban
residents’ quality of life and bringing renewed legitimacy to the state’s instruments of
oppression. 92
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¶42

By becoming urban economic actors, migrants maintain otherwise moribund urban
industries;93
supply[] vegetables to the cities and so work[] against inflation; stock[] its
markets and servic[e] its “proper” city residents; . . . [and] empty[] out the
countryside and so solv[e] problems of rural under-development, poverty and
rural unemployment. 94

¶43

They also regularly take on the “dirty, dangerous, and degrading” jobs more prosperous
city dwellers will not perform. 95 Essentially, they act as an economic mortar, filling the labor
and supply gaps that would otherwise pervade the urban market, and strengthening the edifice of
the current (government-maintained) economic system.
¶44
Nevertheless, urban residents often overlook migrants’ economic contributions and
regard rural Chinese as economic competitors and the source of China’s urban social ills. 96
Popular lore holds that migrants place great pressure on urban infrastructure and government
finances;97 specifically, they purportedly inconvenience urban residents by overburdening
housing, education, sanitation, electricity, traffic, and even food-service conditions. 98
Furthermore, urbanites believe migrants have greatly contributed to increasing crime rates and
rampant excess births outside of the populatio n control system. 99 In effect, urban Chinese hold
migrants responsible for all social afflictions, from economic instability and drug dealing, to
general disruption of the social peace. 100
¶45
On the economic front, reforms have eroded urban residents’ job stability, and incoming
migrants have exacerbated this stress by increasing labor market competitiveness. 101 Aside from
simply adding to the labor pool, migrants have fallen into a role akin to illegal immigrants in
other countries because of their agricultural hukou status. 102 They receive few or no institutional
protections, permitting employers to hire, fire, and pay them at abnormally low cost. 103 The
legal disabilities foisted upon rural hukou-holding Chinese erode the comparative advantage of
urban Chinese with respect to migrants in the urban labor market, thereby making urban Chinese
workers relatively unattractive to hire. Consequently, just as one finds in other countries, urban
residents believe the ‘illegal alien’ migrants subvert their economic opportunities.
¶46
For example, the semi- legal migrant labor market the hukou system has created 104
exacerbates the social strains caused by the failure of the planned economy’s state-owned
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enterprises (“SOEs”). As SOEs have shed millions of urban-hukou employees in desperate
attempts to reduce financial losses, they have turned to migrants as less expensive replacements
and “a path to easy profit ability.”105 By facilitating massive job displacement among urban
Chinese, who once received lifetime employment guarantees from the government as a part of
Mao’s fabled ‘iron rice bowl’ (tie fanwan), job market competition between those with urban
hukou and those with agricultural hukou registrations has spawned destabilizing tensions within
urban areas. 106
¶47
Consequently, because urban residents disdain migrants for the perceived social and
economic problems they create, the periodic government campaigns to deport them and “strike
hard” against (migrant) criminals (regardless of the tier of government that instigates them)
receive broad support among urbanites despite the campaigns’ ambiguous effects. 107 By
ostensibly addressing one of the greatest concerns among urban Chinese—protecting the cities
from this dangerously “unaccountable, untraceable, [and] hard to control” group—the central
government burnishes its own image along with that of its repressive institutions at the expense
of its rural citizens. 108
VII.
¶48

CONCLUSION

Within the three decades following China’s opening to the world, the hukou system has
changed from a policy designed to glean the economic surplus of rural China to fuel urban
industrialization into a bewildering hodgepodge of legal constraints that inadvertently aid
economic growth and simultaneously preserve the aura of the state’s mandate to rule. Though
maintaining the household registration system has created various unexpected benefits for
government officials at national and local levels, for urban residents, and even for China’s
economy as a whole, the system has invariably done so in an inefficient manner that facilitates
economic and social violence against the country’s most vulnerable citizens—its peasants.
Perhaps even more worrying due to its grand scale and unforeseeable implications, Beijing’s
desire to control migratory behavior through hukou restrictions has undermined the state’s
overall ability to project non- violent power and to implement the rule of law. 109 Despite the
media’s incessant fawning over the mammoth economic potential of China’s growing market
and its assured future status as a great power, Beijing’s inability to govern effectively and to
establish a sound legal system will significantly postpone the day that vision reaches fruition.
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